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I. INTRODUCfiON 
While 160 nations have signed the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention ("CWC"), only 75 countries have ratified it thus far. On 
April 25, 1997, after years of political maneuvers, the U.S. Sen-
ate finally added the United States to the list, after a vote that 
was considered too close to call until shortly before ratification. 1 
Although the final Senate vote was a lop-sided 74 to 26, the pe-
riod prior to ratification witnessed a great deal of jockeying, as 
liberal supporters of the treaty criticized their conservative op-
ponents.2 This liberal support was a little surprising because 
there are important objections to the treaty based on the Fourth 
Amendment, which liberals, in other contexts, have supported. 
Obviously the goal of the CWC-removing the terror of 
chemical weapons-is laudable, but its procedures raise impor-
tant questions under the Bill of Rights, particularly under the 
Fourth Amendment, regulating searches and seizures, and the 
Fifth Amendment, guaranteeing no taking of property without 
just compensation. Some proponents of the CWC have re-
sponded to the constitutional argument by attacking the motives 
of those who raise these constitutional questions, accusing them 
of really being "glued to a 'we're No.1' mentality."3 
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I. What's News, Wall Street Journal AI (Apri125, 1997). 
2. Thomas E. Ricks, Senate Approves Chemical-Arms Pact, Wall Street Journal 
A2 (Apr. 25, 1997). 
3. See, e.g., Mary McGrory, A Lott of Gas, Washington Post Cl (Dec. 22, 1996), 
who repeats a refrain often found in the popular discussion of the CWC. She said: 
"Opponents, meanwhile, are glued to a 'we're No. 1' mentality: We should not be sub-
ject to unannounced, foreign inspection." I d. C2 . 
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Whatever one thinks of the bona fides of those who criticize 
the ewe, it is noteworthy that supporters of the ewe have 
urged Congress to enact legislation that would prohibit state and 
federal courts from enjoining ewe inspections even when those 
inspections and searches violate the Constitution.4 Surely, it is 
reasonable to be concerned about the constitutionality of the 
searches authorized by the CWC, when its supporters concede 
the constitutional problem and try to work around it, not by 
amending the ewe, but by limiting the courts' jurisdiction to 
enforce the Constitution.5 
Before directly turning to the Constitutional questions, it is 
important to put the issue in perspective. It was not necessary 
for the United States to ratify the ewe in order to eliminate its 
stockpile of chemical weapons. We can eliminate our own 
stockpile unilaterally. (In fact, we already have decided to 
4. E.g., Barry Kellman and Edward Tanzman, Implementing the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention: Legal Issues (Lawyers Alliance for World Security, Committee for Na-
tional Security, July, 1994) at 16: 
"While judicial interference with the CWC is unlikely because of national secu-
rity and foreign affairs implication, a legislative ban on injunctions against ewe 
inspections would eliminate this risk entirely. Instead of seeking an injunction, 
the subject of the inspection should be permitted to seek monetary damages as 
compensation for any losses resulting from an unconstitutional search." 
[emphasis added.] 
Limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts so that they cannot enjoin violations of 
the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional. If a search is unconstitutional, Congress 
cannot avoid that problem by limiting the courts' jurisdiction to rule on that claim. See 
Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Fed-
eral Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 Georgetown L.J. 839 (1976). See also 
1 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance 
and Procedure§§ 2.10, 2.11 (West Publishing, 2d ed. 1992). 
The Clinton Administration has argued that it can bypass the warrant clause for na-
tional security purposes. SeeR. Jeffrey Smith, Administration Backing No-Warrant Spy 
Searches, Washington Post A19 (July 15, 1994), quoting Deputy Attorney General Ja-
mie S. Gorelick, who claimed that the President "has inherent authority to conduct war-
rantless searches for foreign intelligence purposes." ld. Of course, President Clinton is 
not the only President to make such claims. President Nixon asserted similar powers. 
Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power 439-85 (Free Press, 1987). 
5. Kellman and Tanzman, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (cited 
in note 4) argue that Congress should authorize a damage remedy; they argue that the 
Government should specifically consent to suit under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 136(b), 2680, so that it is clear that "a victim of an unconstitutional search 
can receive damages, during unconstitutional arms control verification activities .... " 
Kellman and Tanzman, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention at 18 (cited in 
note 4) (emphasis added). 
However, violations of the Fourth Amendment, like violations of the First Amend-
ment's free speech guarantee, cannot be "cured" by a damage remedy. If damages were 
an effective remedy, there would be no need for an exclusionary rule. As discussed be-
low, the Fifth Amendment clause prohibiting the taking of property "without just com-
pensation" is the only clause where money damages provide a cure. 
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eliminate our chemical arms by 2004, prior to the time we would 
have to eliminate them under the treaty.) 
Similarly, the ratification of the ewe does not prevent the 
United States from renouncing the use of chemical weapons. In 
the past, the United States has threatened to use chemical 
weapons only in retaliation-if other countries used those 
weapons first. We can, if we wish, unilaterally forgo any chemi-
cal retaliatory option. Again, the ewe has nothing to do with 
that issue. 
The dispute involving the ewe focuses, instead, on differ-
ent questions. Is the manufacture and storage of chemical 
weapons verifiable-particularly when the manufacturer is a 
private person, and the storage facility is some terrorist's ga-
rage? Are the intrusive search mechanisms of this treaty consti-
tutional? If this particular treaty, even with its intrusive 
searches, still allows too many loopholes that impinge on verifi-
cation, does that affect the analysis of the Fourth Amendment? 
Is it proper for the United States to authorize inspectors (who 
will be searching for evidence of a crime6) to engage in extensive 
and highly intrusive searches without any requirement or proce-
dure for the inspectors to seek a search warrant? Normally, we 
expect criminal search warrants to describe with particularity 
the places to be searched and the things to be seized. Moreover, 
they may be issued only after a neutral judicial officer finds 
probable cause. But the ewe and its implementing legislation 
provide for none of that.7 Under these circumstances, is this 
treaty constitutional and will it work? 
6. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 21, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), Art. VII, '1'1 1(a), (b), and (c), reprinted in 32 
I.L.M. 800 (1993) ("CWC"). 
These provisions make clear that if the United States ratifies the CWC, it agrees to 
"[p]rohibit natural and legal persons" within its jurisdiction from "undertaking any ac-
tivity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legis-
lation with respect to such activity." CWC, Art. VII, H(a) (emphasis added). 
Further, the United States will obligate itself to "[e]xtend its penal legislation en-
acted under subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Con-
vention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in confor-
mity with international law." CWC, Art. VII, 'I 1(c) (emphasis added). Note that this 
subparagraph requires that the penal legislation conform to international law. There is 
no requirement that the legislation must conform to our Constitution. It is not a de-
fense, under this subparagraph, that the United States refuses to enact penal legislation 
on the grounds that it violates our Constitution. 
7. Initially, the proposed Chemical Weapons Implementation Act-which will 
ensure observance of the requirements of the CWC-provides for the use of search war-
rants, and for warrantless search warrants in exigent circumstances. See S. 495, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1997), proposed Title I, §§ 229A(a)(1),(2), in 143 Cong. Rec. S2660 
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II. LIMITATIONS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
CONVENTION 
A. INTRODUcriON 
Proponents of the ewe typically claim that American rati-
fication is essential because it is our last great chance to outlaw 
chemical warfare. For all its defects, supporters say that it is 
better than nothing, and that its benefits justify limiting and nar-
rowly applying the Fourth Amendment.8 Opponents express 
concern that the Chemical Weapons Convention-although it 
authorizes very intrusive searches without warrants and without 
probable cause-is like a generous legacy in a pauper's will,9 
which promises much but delivers little, because of its significant 
loopholes. 
The question of whether the CWC accompanies intrusive 
searches with significant loopholes has a Fourth Amendment 
dimension, because, as discussed below, the Court is more likely 
to invalidate a statutory10 system of searches that is not well-
designed and narrowly tailored to ferret out wrongdoing.11 A 
defective ewe that is not carefully drafted and promises more 
than it can deliver is more likely to be invalid under the Fourth 
Amendment. If the ewe has both intrusive searches and sig-
nificant loopholes, then it is much worse than a generous legacy 
in a pauper's will, for it intrudes on important constitutional 
rights without fulfilling its promise of eliminating chemical war-
fare. 
Let us now turn to some of the political issues that affect 
the question whether the ewe is verifiable and consider if these 
(daily ed., March 20, 1997). See generally 3 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, 
Treatise on Constitutional Law§§ 18.30 (b) (cited in note 4) (discussing some emerging 
issues involving the right to privacy). 
8. See, e.g., Thomas A. Connolly, Does the Constitution Limit On-Site Inspec-
tion?, Arms Control Today 8 (July, 1988). See also Edward L. Rowny, Yes to the Chemi-
cal Weapons Accord, Washington Post A21 (April 23, 1997), supponing the CWC as 
better than nothing and stating: "However, I must emphasize that we should not be 
overly optimistic about the effectiveness of the CWC"; David Kay, et al., First the 
Treaty, Then the Hard Work, Washington Post C7 (April 13, 1997), stating: "A perfect 
solution? No. But clearly it is better than the available alternatives." 
9. Cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring): "a 
promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest 
in a pauper's will." 
10. The CWC is not a self-executing treaty and Congress will have to enact a statu-
tory scheme to implement it. 
11. Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997), discussed in Pan II.D. at 137-39. 
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political issues may influence the resolution of the constitutional 
questions. 
B. NON-SIGNATORIES 
One inherent limitation of the CWC is that outlaw coun-
tries can simply refuse to ratify it. The threat posed to the 
United States by chemical weapons is less likely to come from 
countries like Sweden, than from pariah states like Libya, Syria, 
North Korea, and Iraq-none of which have ever signed the 
treaty, let alone ratified it. Moreover, we should also expect 
that some foreign countries that do sign the ewe will evade it 
by movinfl their chemical weapons facilities to non-signatory 
countries. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency has 
acknowledged that: "Some other republics [of the former Soviet 
Union] maintain that Russia still has chemical weapons materi-
als in their territories."13 
C. THE CWC'S LIMITED BAN OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
Countries that do ratify the CWC can also avoid violation 
or detection by redirecting their chemical efforts. Given the na-
ture of chemical weapons, many chemicals have multiple uses, 
only one of which would be illegal under the treaty. There is no 
way to avoid this problem because chemicals necessary to pro-
duce mustard gas are also needed to produce ink for pens.14 
Chlorine was used in World War I in chemical warfare, though 
today we use it legally for laundry.15 The Nazi gas chambers re-
lied on legal rodenticides, and many legal dyes, drugs, additives, 
and pesticides can become chemical weapons by minor changes 
in their processing.16 Ordinary chemicals can be put to extraor-
dinary, and lethal, use. 
12. E.g., Mark Yost, China's Deadly Trade in the Mideast, Wall Street Journal A-
18 (Dec. 4, 1996), reporting that U.S. intelligence sources, relying on documents seized 
from Germans involved with illegal weapons sales, are concerned that China may be 
involved in supplying equipment for an underground chemical weapons factory in Syria. 
China has also been a supplier to Mideast countries such as Iran and Iraq. 
13. See Letter of August 27, 1993, from Admiral William 0. Studeman (then Act-
ing Director of the CIA) to Senator John Glenn (on file with the author). 
14. Even supporters of the CWC concede this point. E.g., Mary McGrory, A Lott 
of Gas C2 (cited in note 3). 
15. Ian V. Hogg, Gas 24 (Ballantine Books, 1975). 
16. E.g., John Adams, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Legal and Juridical Ob-
servations, 1 International and Security Law News 3 (Fall, 1996) <http://www.homesites. 
com/fed-sodin010104.htm>. 
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We should also expect that other countries will develop 
more advanced chemical weapons that work around the restric-
tions of the ewe and exploit its limitations. The intelligence 
community recently reported that Russia is developing and pro-
ducing a new generation of chemical weapons that are not cov-
ered by the eWC's Schedule of ehemicals.17 Just as restrictive 
tax laws spawn more creative tax shelters, the ewe should be 
expected to beget different types of chemical weapons. The 
ewe will likely channel (rather than ban) chemical weapons 
development into types that may be more insidious, more dan-
gerous, and less detectable. 
These new Russian nerve gases, such as A-232, are made 
from common industrial and agricultural chemicals. Two rela-
tively harmless compounds are stored in separate containers. 
Because they are not lethal until mixed, they are easier to manu-
facture than conventional nerve gas, more difficult to detect, 
and safer to transport and stockpile, until they are mixed to-
gether, when they then become deadly. Even microscopic 
amounts of A-232 can kill. This type of chemical weapon was 
expressly designed to be outside of the ewe ban. If Russia 
were to ratify the ewe, production of these types of chemical 
weapons (called Novichok "binary" weapons) could continue.18 
The ewe does not affect weapons designed to circumvent its 
verification regime. 
A veteran Soviet chemical weapons specialist, who con-
firmed the development of these binary weapons (and was jailed 
for his whistle-blowing), has reported: 
Our generals see the implementation of the [CWC] treaty 
with its loopholes as a way to dispose of their obsolete and 
hazardous stockpiles with American taxpayer's help, while 
preserving their new classes of toxins and, even worse, permit-
ting their sale abroad for hard currency.19 
D. OTHER LOOPHOLES 
The ewe claims that it will eliminate all chemical weapons 
and will effectively ban their use, development, production, de-
17. Bill Gertz, Russia Dodges Chemical Arms Ban: New Nerve Agent Hard to Un· 
cover, Washington Times A1 (Feb. 4, 1997), available at 1997 WL 3662854. 
18. J. Michael Waller, The Chemical Weapons Coverup, Wall Street Journal A18 
(Feb. 13, 1997). 
19. Vii Mirzayanov, Free to Develop Chemical Weapons, Wall Street Journal A16 
(May 25, 1994), available at 1994 WL 333375. Mr. Mirzayanov was jailed in 1992 and in 
1994 for revealing Moscow's continuation of covert chemical weapons production. 
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ployment, and stockpiling.20 When something sounds too good 
to be true, it usually is. Consider an unremarkable chemical im-
plement of war' riot control chemicals, and what the ewe says 
about them. The CWC signatories solemnly agree that -
Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a 
method of warfare. 21 
"Chemical Weapons" are defined as including-"Toxic chemi-
cals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes 
not prohibited under this Convention .... "22 
This definition does not seem noteworthy, until one moves 
to another section of the ewe, where we learn that what the 
right hand giveth, the left hand taketh away, for the ewe tells 
us that the phrase, "Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Con-
vention," means, among other things: "Law enforcement in-
cluding domestic riot control purposes. "23 
In short, countries may develop, test, stockpile, and use riot 
control chemicals, as long as they purport to use them domesti-
cally. The CWC does not ban riot control chemicals; instead, it 
appears to authorize countries to use against their own civilians 
what they may not use against enemy troops in time of war.24 
Moreover, if these riot control weapons are used against enemy 
troops, we may never know for sure. Even today, not all 
authorities agree on the extent to which there was the use of 
chemical weapons by the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam 
War, and by the Iraqis during the Gulf War.25 
20. ewe, Preamble, 6th 'I (unnumbered] (cited in note 6), states that its goal is: 
"to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons." A related (and 
somewhat inconsistent) goal is: "to promote free trade in chemicals ... " Id. at 9th 'I 
[unnumbered]. 
21. CWC, An. I, 'I 5 (cited in note 6). 
22. CWC, An. II, 'l1(a) (cited in note 6). 
23. CWC, An. II, 'I 9(d) (cited in note 6) (emphasis added). 
24. President Clinton has announced that he interprets the ewe to forbid the 
United States from using riot control agents "even for humanitarian purposes in situa-
tions where combatants and noncombatants are intermingled, such as the rescue of 
downed air crews, passengers and escaping prisoners and situations where civilians are 
being used to mask or screen attacks." Statement of June 23, 1994, quoted in Letter of 
Senator Jesse Helms to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Feb. 13, 1997 at 6 (on 
file with author). So foreign countries can continue to manufacture and store riot con-
trol agents, while the United States will be forbidden to use these agents when they are 
the most humane way of rescuing downed air crews. He is interpreting the ewe more 
strictly than the military has been interpreting it, and more strictly than the drafters in-
terpreted it. ld. 
25. See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Analysts of Iraqi Chemical Weapons in Gulf Inter-
viewed Only Last Month, Washington Post A18 (April16, 1997). 
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Another particularly significant loophole is found in a por-
tion of the ewe that authorizes the inspection team to examine 
vehicular traffic exiting the inspection site,26 but excludes from 
this inspection all "personal passenger vehicles exiting the 
site .... "21 Chemical weapons are not like armored tanks. 
Chemical weapons can be easily hidden in the trunk of any pas-
senger car. Sometimes only drops of a chemical are needed to 
cause many deaths. The ewe provision exempting passenger 
trunks only guarantees that those who wish to transport chemi-
cal weapons right under the noses of the CWC inspectors will 
use the trunks of their passenger cars rather than pickup trucks. 
Of course, the fact that the ewe will not be entirely effec-
tive is not, by itself, an argument against it. The best should not 
be an enemy of the good. However, ratification of the CWC 
may lull our vigilance and undercut future efforts to develop a 
Convention that works. The ewe, in that case, would undercut 
rather that promote the reduction of chemical weapons. 
More importantly, loopholes like these in the CWC affect 
the analysis of the Fourth Amendment. Consider Chandler v. 
Miller, 28 where the Court invalidated a Georgia law that re-
quired candidates for certain state offices to certify that they had 
tested negative for illegal drug use within 30 days prior to quali-
fying for nomination. The Court (8 to 1) found that the statute 
was unconstitutional because it was an unreasonable 
"suspicionless" search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. In 
the course of its analysis of the problem, the Court found that an 
important reason the Georgia law was invalid under the Fourth 
Amendment is that-
Georgia's certification requirement is not well designed to 
identify candidates who violate antidrug laws. Nor is the 
scheme a credible means to deter illicit drug users from seeking 
election to state office. The test date-to be scheduled by the 
candidate anytime within 30 days prior to qualifying for a 
place on the ballot-is no secret.... [U]sers of illegal drugs, 
save for those prohibitively addicted, could abstain for a pre-
test period sufficient to avoid detection.29 
26. ewe, Verification Annex, Part X (Challenge Inspections), n 29, 30 (cited in 
note 6). 
27. ewe, Verification Annex, Part X (Challenge Inspections), 'I 30 (cited in note 
6). 
28. 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997). 
29. 117 S. Ct. at 1303-04 (emphasis added). 
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A similar analysis applies to the CWC. A treaty that pro-
vides for suspiciousless searches of factories and trucks leaving 
the factory but not the trunks of cars leaving these factories is, 
like the law invalidated in Chandler, a treaty that "is not well 
designed to identify [people] who violate [chemical weapons] 
laws." Nor does the CWC offer "a credible means to deter il-
licit" production and storage of chemical weapons. 
E. FAILURE OF WILL 
In order for the CWC to work, it must be enforced. We 
would expect that the United States will be willing to enforce 
the treaty within our own borders. If we find a terrorist group 
clandestinely storing chemical weapons, we would take action. 
But will the United States or other nations be willing to take ac-
tion against a state that is found to have violated the treaty? 
There have been disquieting reports that the international 
community, including the United States, is not enforcing the 
blockade against Iraq.30 If nations, including the United States, 
will not vigorously enforce sanctions against Iraq, imposed after 
it was defeated in a war, will they enforce the CWC? This fail-
ure of will, while troubling, is more of a political than a constitu-
tional issue and probably does not affect the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis under cases like Chandler. 
F. INABILITY TO VERIFY 
Perhaps no Convention, no matter how intrusive its search 
mechanisms, can stop a small number of individuals from creat-
ing or storing chemical weapons. U.S. military experts have tes-
tified that it is a fruitless exercise to stamp out these easily con-
cealable weapons. As CIA Director R. James Woolsey said in 
1994: "The chemical-weapons problem is so difficult from an in-
telligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high con-
fidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a 
small scale."31 Others have echoed this view.32 Neophytes 
should not jump in where experts fear to tread. 
30. Mark Yost, Iran Helps Iraq Beat Oil Embargo; Will U.S. Respond?, Wall Street 
Journal A18 (Feb. 13, 1997). Vice Admiral Thomas B. Fargo announced that there is 
solid evidence that Iran is helping Iraq smuggle oil, but "[s]everal Navy officers said that 
they had been told not to scrutinize Iranian-flagged vessels closely, even in international 
waters." I d. 
31. J. Michael Waller, The Chemical Weapons Coverup, A18 (cited in note 18). 
Similarly, a National Intelligence Estimate, in May of 1995, concluded that production 
of new chemical weapons "would be difficult to detect and confirm as a CWC-sponsored 
activity." Id. 
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Our experience thus far should cause us to be modest in es-
timating our ability to ferret out chemical weapons production 
and storage. Consider the U.N. experience with Iraq. The cur-
rent inspection of Iraq (defeated in the Persian Gulf War) by 
the United Nations Special Commission ("UNSCOM") is the 
most intrusive, systematic, and rigorous inspection in modem 
times. UNSCOM has had unprecedented access to Iraq for 
years. Yet the United Nations did not uncover significant in-
formation about Iraq's chemical weapons capability from its on-
site inspectors. Rather, it uncovered this information because of 
a defector.33 Intrusive as the CWC is, it will not be as intrusive 
as the inspection of a defeated nation by the victors in war. Yet, 
Iraq was able to conceal this significant information from U.N. 
inspectors, until the defection of a key soldier. 
The inability to verify, like the treaty loopholes, is not just a 
political issue but a constitutional one under cases like Chandler. 
Recall that the Court there said that one reason the Georgia law 
must be invalidated is that the Georgia scheme is not "a credible 
means to deter illicit drug users from seeking election to state 
office," because it was easily evaded.34 
If the problem with the ewe were merely its inability to 
verify violations, it would merely be useless, like a magnificent 
legacy in a pauper's will. But the CWC is much worse if it also 
compromises our constitutional guarantees. Then, unlike an 
empty legacy, it will cause actual harm. The average American 
business or a typical individual-neither of whom are in the 
business of manufacturing poison gas-will be subject to exten-
sive and intrusive inspections, that may violate the Fourth 
Amendment and the Fifth Amendment. To those issues we now 
tum. 
32. For example, then Vice President Bush said that "plants for producing chemi-
cal weapons are difficult to distinguish from plants producing chemicals for industry and, 
in fact, some chemicals with peaceful utility are structurally similar to some chemicals 
that are used in warfare. So verification is particularly difficult with chemical weapons." 
Speech by Vice President George Bush, Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weap-
ons Convention, April 18, 1984, reprinted in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, Documents on Disarmament 299,300 (1984). 
33. Hussein Kamel's defection prompted Baghdad to tum over 100 boxes of in-
formation about its chemical and biological weapons' program. The U.N. did not know 
about this information, and it never would have come to light had there been no defec-
tion. See Daniel Williams, Iraqi Defectors Killed On Return to Baghdad; Relatives Re-
portedly Shot Brothers, Washington Post A1, A18 (Feb. 24, 1996); Greg Myre, After 5 
Years in Iraq, Work Is Still Turbulent for U.N. Arms Inspectors, Washington Post A16 
(April 9, 1996). 
34. 117 S. Ct. at 1304. 
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Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Does the proposed Convention violate constitutional guar-
antees? In particular, let us focus on two constitutional issues-
the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment and 
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
First, if the intrusive searches result in loss of intellectual 
property, will just compensation be provided? Even supporters 
of the ewe acknowledge that it may facilitate or enable foreign 
governments or inspectors from those governments to engage in 
industrial espionage, the theft of trade secrets, and the taking of 
other types of intellectual property.35 The ewe itself offers no 
just com:fensation for those whose property has been literally 
"taken." 
Second, do the inspection mechanisms that the Convention 
envisions violate the Fourth Amendment protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures?· The ewe contemplates ex-
tremely intrusive searches of private property. The ewe search 
of private property must be unusually thorough to have any 
chance of working effectively, but such invasive searches create 
a greater risk of a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Numer-
ous businesses or persons will be subject to these searches. Be-
cause of the multiple uses of chemicals and the ease with which 
many chemical weapons can be created or stored, we may ex-
pect searches of over ten thousand U.S. businesses (perhaps 
50,000 industrial facilities or more), that might use, produce, or 
35. E.g., Barry Kellman, et al., Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Control 
Verification Can Proceed Without Threatening Confidential Business Information, 36 
Harv. Inti. L.J. 71, 101 (1995). 
36. The Chemical Manufacturers Association has supported a global ban on the 
manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Yet it has also expressed concern for 
the "loss of proprietary information," because of the work of the international agency 
that the ewe creates. The loss of trade secrets can amount to a "multimillion dollar 
price tag." It "can cripple even a giant company and can be fatal to a smaller enter-
prise." The U.S. Chemica/Industry Can Live With a Chemical Weapons Convention, 
Arms Control Today 21 (Nov., 1989). See also Burrus M. Carnahan, Chemical Arms 
Control, Trade Secrets, and the Constitution: Facing the Unresolved Issues, 25 Inti Law-
yer 167, 170-71 (1991). 
This last point ("fatal to a smaller enterprise") is quite significant. The burdens of 
the ewe fall disproportionately on smaller companies. Companies will also have costs 
associated with inspections. Larger businesses, those who typically have various gov-
ernment contracts, will pass along the expenses to the U.S. Government. Also, for large 
busi~esses, the extra costs are marginal. For smaller businesses, the costs may be pro-
portiOnally greater, and they are less likely to have the luxury of passing on the costs to 
the Government. 
142 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 15:131 
store chemicals.37 Any soap factory or ink pen factory can pro-
duce or store chemical weapons. 
However, CWC searches are not limited to places of busi-
ness. Private homes are also subject to CWC inspections.38 
One's garage or bedroom can be the storage place for chemical 
weapons, or the place of their manufacture. Japan (which is not 
limited by our Fourth Amendment) was unable to prevent are-
ligious cult from producing and using sarin in its poison gas at-
tack in the Tokyo subways. The cult made these chemical 
weapons in a small, undistinguished room-not a high-tech lab. 
As General William Burns (then head of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency) has said, "chemical weapons 
can be manufactured in almost anyone's garage, as long as you 
have a little high school chemistry behind you. "39 If even ex-
tremely intrusive mechanisms will not be truly effective (and the 
evidence suggests that they will not), then one wonders if all of 
this is worth the candle. 
B. APPLICABILITY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
It should cause no shock that the U.S. Constitution applies 
in foreign affairs, and that a treaty or executive agreement that 
conflicts with the Constitution is unconstitutional. Surprisingly, 
however, some commentators have occasionally argued, even in 
recent times, that the foreign affairs power or so-called national 
security powers limit the application of the Constitution. For 
example, during the oral argument in Dames & Moore v. 
Regan,«) which upheld the Iranian Hostage Executive Agree-
ment, a lawyer supporting the Agreement argued that the 
United States must release Iranian assets simply because the 
Executive Agreement said so. Justice Rehnquist asked: "What 
if the agreement had said no one in the U.S. should criticize the 
37. E.g., Adams, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Legal and Juridical Obser-
vations at 10 (cited in note 16) (over 10,000 sites); Carnahan, 25 Inti. Law at 180 (cited in 
note 36) (50,000 sites "might reasonably be subject to challenge inspection.") (footnote 
omitted). 
38. CWC, Art. IX, 'I (cited in note 6). See also, Kellman, et al., 36 Harv. Inti. L.J. 
at 92 (cited in note 35). 
39. Eric Hamburg, Constitution vs. Arms Control, New York Times A19 (Dec. 18, 
1989). 
40. 453 u.s. 654 (1981). 
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Ayatollah? Would the U.S. be liable?" The lawyer said yes! 41 
The Court, fortunately, rejected that argument.42 
Justice Black, in Reid v. eovert,43 articulated what is the 
generally accepted view today among commentators and courts: 
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. 
Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act 
in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitu-
tion .... The concept that the Bill of Rights and other consti-
tutional protections against arbitrary government are inopera-
tive when they become inconvenient or when expediency 
dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed 
to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution 
and undermine the basis of our government. ... [N]o agree-
ment with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, 
or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the 
restraints of the Constitution.44 
In short, if the United States could not constitutionally search a 
factory, or a storage area, or a garage without a search warrant 
or probable cause, then it cannot constitutionally authorize for-
eign inspectors to engage in such searches. The United States 
cannot delegate to foreign officials a power that it does not pos-
sess. Searches that violate the Fourth Amendment are not 
cured of the violation by the simple expediency of a treaty ratifi-
• • 45 
catiOn or an executive agreement. 
Sometimes people argue that Congress should leave to the 
courts the responsibility of sorting out these constitutional ar-
guments.46 It is certainly true that the courts are the ultimate 
safeguard of our liberty, but that ultimate safeguard should not 
be used as an excuse for an earlier violation. The courts, when 
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, typically presume 
41. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Modern Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes 256 
(West Publishing, 5th ed. 1997). 
42. See John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, A Comment on the Creation and 
Resolution of a "Nonproblem": Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Foreign Affairs Power, 
and the Role of the Court, 29 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1129 (1982). 
43. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion). No other Justice disagreed with Justice 
Black's statement. The contrary view derives from some dictum, taken out of context, 
by Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
44. 354 U.S. at 5-6, 14, 16 (Black, J., joined by Warren, C.J., Douglas, J., and 
Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). 
45. This issue is discussed in detail in 1 Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitu-
tional Law: Substance and Procedure § 6.5 (cited in note 4 ). 
46. For example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in urging a Congressman to 
support a bill in 1935, said: "I hope your committee will not permit doubts as to constitu-
tionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation." Quoted in Rotunda, 
Modern Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes at 11 (cited in note 41). 
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that it is constitutional. That presumption assumes that Con-
gress has exercised its independent judgment. Congress should 
not abdicate its constitutional duty when enacting legislation 
that implements the CWC.47 
C. APPLICATION OF CWCTO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 
In evaluating the constitutional arguments, it is important 
to realize that the ewe is unlike many treaties, which usually 
apply only to governments. The CWC not only bans foreign 
countries from manufacturing, developing, and storing certain 
chemical weapons,48 it also directly apglies the same restrictions 
to private individuals and companies. 9 The countries ratifying 
the ewe must allow international inspectors to engage in 
"systematic verification through on-site inspection and moni-
toring with on-site instruments" of publicly or privately owned 
places where targeted chemical weapons might be produced, 
stored, etc. 50 
D. JUST COMPENSATION 
The Constitution provides that no private proEerty shall 
"be taken for public use, without just compensation." 1 Intellec-
tual property is a form of property. 52 If the federal government 
simply takes this property, the Constitution requires that it pay 
just compensation. If the federal government instead sets up a 
legal structure that authorizes international inspectors to engage 
in intrusive inspections that allow them to make off with intel-
lectual property, there is also a "taking" for purposes of the just 
compensation clause. 53 Even CWC supporters have conceded 
that the "procedures likely to be applied to verify arms control 
47. When a House Member argued that it would be "officious" to debate the con· 
stitutionality, Madison responded that "it is incontrovertibly of as much importance of 
this branch of Government as to any other, that the constitution be preserved entire. It 
is our duty." 1 Annals of Congress 500 (1789) (emphasis added). That is why the Court 
gives Congress "the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy." City of Boerne 
11. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172 (1997). 
48. Subject to its various exceptions, definitions, etc. 
49. The ewe makes clear that "the detailed procedures for its implementation 
shall apply to all chemical weapons owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are lo-
cated in any place under its jurisdiction or control .... " CWC, Art. IV, '11 (cited in note 
6) (emphasis added). 
50. CWC, Art. IV, 'I 3 (cited in note 6). 
51. U.S. Const., Amend. 5. 
52. E.g., 2 Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and 
Procedure§ 17.5 (cited in note 4) (di5cussing various types of property). 
53. "Whenever property is taken from someone with the assistance of government 
officers, there is a deprivation of property." Id. at § 17.5(b) (citing cases). 
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treaties are sufficiently intrusive to pose a legitimate threat to" 
confidential business information.54 
Now that the ewe is ratified, the United States must enact 
laws that will implement the ewes extensive inspection re-
quirements backed by penal legislation that would apply to all 
natural or legal persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States and all U.S. citizens abroad.55 The intrusive inspections 
create a serious risk of industrial espionage by foreign inspec-
tors, many of whom come from cultures that do not respect in-
tellectual property rights. 56 If, in the course of ewe inspections, 
trade secrets or other forms of intellectual property are stolen 
because of the eWC's intrusive searches, there will be a taking 
of property, for which the Fifth Amendment guarantees just 
• 51 
compensation. 
The ewe candidly acknowledges and concedes that there 
is a risk of loss of trade secrets and other forms of intellectual 
property. The organization that the ewe creates is supposed to 
take "every precaution" to grotect the civil and military secrets 
of which it becomes aware. This promise however, is vaguely 
worded, does not explain exactly what will be done, and pro-
vides no mechanism for just compensation if intellectual prop-
erty is stolen. If foreign inspectors abuse their position and steal 
intellectual property, then the only realistic remedy is for the 
United States to pay just compensation to those people who 
have suffered damages. 
The ewe allows each ratifying state to request an on-site 
inspection "of any facility or location in the territory or in any 
other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State 
Party" in order to resolve any questions regarding noncompli-
ance.59 The inspected State Party has the "obligation to provide 
54. Kellman, et at., 36 Harv. Inti. L.J. at 125 (cited in note 35) (the authors note 
that, even with careful preventive measures, there will be loss of this information so that 
the government should explore various means of providing just compensation). 
55. CWC, Art. VII, 'I 1(c) (cited in note 6). The countries ratifying the CWC are 
also obligated to enact legislation criminalizing an individual's production of targeted 
chemicals. 
56. These intrusive searches of private property, conducted without a warrant, also 
raise problems under the Fourth Amendment, which will be discussed later. 
57. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,232 (1986) (Dow Chemi-
cal could raise Fifth Amendment "taking" claim if one who searches would use the con-
fidential information obtained to compete with Dow); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 
U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (trade secrets are property protected by the just compensation 
clause). 
58. CWC, Art. VIII, 'I 5 (cited in note 6). 
59. CWC, Art. IX, 'I 8 (cited in note 6). 
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access,"
60 
and the right to "prevent disclosure of confidential in-
formation and data, not related to this Convention. "61 This sec-
tion acknowledges that intellectual property may be compro-
mised, but limits the right to protect intellectual property to 
information "not related to this Convention." 
Given the nature of chemicals that can be used for dual 
purposes (one legal, one illegal), virtually all relevant intellec-
tual property will be "related to this Convention." Rather than 
protecting intellectual property, the ewe recognizes that intel-
lectual property can be compromised, but then limits the right of 
the United States to protect the theft of the intellectual property 
of its citizens. This provision appears to give U.S. citizens a 
mere right to argue that the information is not related to the 
Convention. Rather than protecting property, the CWC may 
only give victims an opportunity to complain. 
If the United States subsequently suspects that a particular 
foreign inspector is likely to steal trade secrets or to compromise 
any intellectual property during a certain inspection, the ewe 
sets up a rather complex procedure to follow. When the initial 
list of inspectors is presented, a country can declare which in-
spectors it does not accept.62 But once a State Party has been 
notified of an inspection it "shall not seek to have removed from 
the inspection team for that inspection any of the designated in-
spectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection team 
list."63 In addition, if the Director-General of the CWC believes 
that a country's non-acceptance "impedes the designation of a 
sufficient number of inspectors or inspection assistants or other-
wise hampers the effective fulfilment of the tasks of the Techni-
cal Secretariat," then the Director-General must refer the issue 
to the Executive Council.64 
In short, the United States will have the ability to make ini-
tial objections, but these can be overruled by the Executive 
Council. If the United States makes objections, some other 
countries will make counter objections, in a tit-for-tat response, 
just as some countries expel one of our diplomats in reaction to 
our expelling one of theirs. The right to make objections (which 
can be overruled and met with similar objections by other coun-
60. ewe, Art. IX, 'lll(b) (cited in note 6). 
61. ewe, Art. IX, 'Ill( c) (cited in note 6) (emphasis added). 
62. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 2 (cited in note 6). 
63. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 5 (cited in note 6). 
64. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 7 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added). 
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tries) may only provide a thin veneer of protection of American 
interests. 
While the ewe does not set up a just compensation 
scheme, it does recognize that property, including intellectual 
property, may be improperly taken. The Fifth Amendment's just 
compensation clause does not forbid the taking of property. 
The government can take property, if it pays just compensation. 
In that sense, the just compensation clause is different from 
other rights protected by the Bill of Rights, violations of which 
cannot be cured simply by paying compensation. For example, 
if the government prevents a citizen from exercising free speech, 
the government has violated the First Amendment. The af-
fected citizen may always sue the government for damages, but 
payment of the damages does not "cure" the original violation. 
If there is a theft of intellectual property because of the 
ewe searches, the U.S. Government can "cure" this taking of 
property by providing for just compensation. But first it must 
establish a procedure to provide just compensation. The Gov-
ernment has not yet done so, and theories of compensation un-
der present law are unclear at best.65 Now that the United States 
has ratified the ewe, it should tum its attention to creating a 
fair, prompt, and reasonable procedure for just compensation. 
This new just compensation law will have to deal with some 
difficult procedural issues. For example, if an American claims 
that an inspector stole his or her trade secrets, will the American 
be able to subpoena the foreign inspector? If the foreign inspec-
tor refuses to submit to a deposition and discovery of relevant 
materials, who will bear the cost of that refusal? Will the bur-
den of proof shift if the foreign inspector ignores an American 
subpoena? Implementing legislation should provide that the 
United States Government would bear the cost, because it is the 
United States Government that has authorized the inspector to 
enter the country, to inspect the premises, and then to leave the 
jurisdiction of the United States and its courts. 
This new law will also have to determine how to measure 
the value of the property that has been taken. The typical rule, 
as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes announced, is that amount 
65. See Carnahan, 25 Inti. Law at 173-77 (cited in note 36). 
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due is measured by "What has the owner lost? not, What has the 
taker gained. "66 
There is an additional issue regarding just compensation. 
As discussed in the next section, Fourth Amendment violations 
cannot be "cured" merely by the payment of compensation. If 
an action violates both the Fourth and the Fifth Amendment, 
the remedies for the two violations are independent. The per-
son whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated will also have 
a Fifth Amendment right to compensation if there has been an 
unlawful physical intrusion of his premises.67 
If the law limits the right of the owner of property to ex-
clude others from areas that the property owner did not open to 
the general public (which is exactly what the ewe does, by 
granting a right of entrance to the inspectors, a right that is per-
manent as long as the ewe is in force), there is a taking for 
which compensation is due.68 As Justice Thurgood Marshall has 
noted: "The power to exclude has traditionally been considered 
one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of prop-
erty rights. "69 
Even if the degree of intrusion is quite minor, compensa-
tion is still due. Consider, for example, Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp. 70 A city ordinance required an owner 
of a rental building to allow installation of a cable television re-
ceiver on the outside of the landlord's apartment building 
(portions of her roof and the side of her building). The ordi-
nance tried to avoid the takings issue by paying a one-time $1 
fee. Justice Marshall, for the majority, rejected the city's argu-
ment and held that there was a taking, for which just compensa-
tion was due, even if the amount of the physical intrusion is no 
"bigger than a breadbox."71 
66. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910). See also 2 
Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 15.14 
(cited in note 4). 
67. Physical occupations are per se takings, for which just compensation is due. 
See, e.g., id. at§ 15.12 and cases discussed therein. 
68. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
69. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) 
(footnote omitted). 
70. 458 u.s. 419 (1982). 
71. ld. at 438 n.16. 
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E. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
1. Extensive, Thorough, Intrusive Inspections 
The ewe makes clear that the inspectors, during the "non-
challenge inspections," have the right of "unimpeded access to 
the inspection site." These "non-challenge inspections" involve 
sites in the chemical industry that are subject to on-site inspec-
tions on a regular basis. There is no need for a nation to issue a 
"challenge inspection"- based on a suspicion that the building 
may harbor chemical weaponsn-in order for these facilities to 
be subjected to an inspection. The inspectors in these situation 
also have carte blanche in deciding which items can be in-
spected.73 The inspectors can interview personnel at the sites, 
inspect all documents, take photographs, carry away samples, 
analyze the samples, and keep portions of all samples.74 There 
may be continuous monitoring.7 
When it comes to "challenge inspections," the ewe has 
similar carte blanche power in choosing the places for inspection. 
The inspection team must have "unimpeded access to the in-
spection site. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the 
inspectors."76 The inspectors "shall have the right to inspect 
documentation and records they deem relevant to the conduct 
of their mission."n They have the right to have samples taken.78 
There is no evidentiary standard. There is no neutral magis-
trate. Indeed, the ewe authorizes the inspection team to use 
"more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary."79 The 
inspection team polices itself. There is no probable cause; there 
is no oath; there is no search warrant describing with particular-
ity the places to be searched or the things to be seized. The 
ewe inspection compares to the general, thorough, house-to-
house search that one might expect in wartime, in the midst of 
the theater of war, while looking for a spy. 
72. ewe, Verification Annex, Part X, Challenge Inspections Pursuant to Art. IX, 
'I 41 (cited in note 6). 
73. CWC, Art. VI; CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, General Rules of Verifica-
tion, '145 (cited in note 6). 
74. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II, General Rules of Verification, H 46-58 
(cited in note 6). The inspection team need only supply a warning of 24 hours before 
showing up at the point of entry. For the initial inspection, the warning is 72 hours. 
75. CWC, Verification Annex, Part III, 11 10, 17, 18 (cited in note 6). 
76. CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 45 (cited in note 6). 
77. CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 47 (cited in note 6). 
78. CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 52 (cited in note 6). 
79. CWC, Verification Annex, Part X, 'I 45 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added). 
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Compare the general search envisioned by the CWC with 
the Supreme Court's description of the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment: 
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the 
things to be seized makes general searches under them impos-
sible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant 
describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left 
to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. 80 
A major purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to prevent ex-
actly that which the ewe authorizes: "general warrants," which 
grant government officials "sweeping power" to invade the 
premises of "merchants and businessmen" in order to "search at 
large for smuggled goods. "81 
2. The Three Main Arguments that May Justify Limiting the 
Application of the Fourth Amendment 
There are three main arguments that proponents of the 
CWC embrace in an effort to avoid the constitutional problems 
arising from the CWC's authorization of extensive and intrusive 
searches, without criminal search warrants, the decision of a 
neutral magistrate, or probable cause. 
a. Foreign Affairs or National Security Power 
First, commentators have argued that the President's 
"national security powers" justify inroads on the Fourth 
Amendment.82 One treaty supporter actually states: 
[P]residential national security powers might permit U.S. con-
sent to highly innovative and informative OSI [i.e. On-Site In-
80. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). Marron is a half century old, 
but since 1927 the Supreme Court has extended the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment, not contracted it. 
81. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (footnotes and citations 
omitted). The Court also noted: "The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects commercial buildings as well as private homes." Id. at 311. Warrantless searches 
are "generally unreasonable," and "this rule applies to commercial premises as well as 
homes." Id. at 312. 
[T]he Fourth Amendment's commands grew in large measure out of the colo-
nists' experience with writs of assistance [which] granted sweeping power to 
customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled 
goods. 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977). 
82. E.g., Connolly, Arms Control Today at 8, 9 (cited in note 8). See also Benja-
min Wittes, Aldrich Ames' Legal Legacy: Surveillance Court Gets New Powers, Legal 
Times 1, 22 (Nov. 7, 1994) (referring to Attorney General Reno's "inherent authority" 
justification of warrantless searches). 
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spection], particularly of commercial facilities with lesser con-
stitutional protection .... Innovative, intrusive OSI of manu-
facturing, transportation, storage and R&D facilities could be 
invaluable tools for arms control. The Constitution is favora-
bly disposed.83 
151 
This national security argument, frankly, is surprising. The 
people who are subject to the searches are neither foreign na-
tionals nor agents of a foreign government; they are U.S. citi-
zens living in the United States, not in the theater of war. Re-
member, when Attorney General John Mitchell tried to use 
national security to undercut the application of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court was unpersuaded.84 It has 
never invoked the political question doctrine to avoid or to dis-
miss an individual's claim that the foreign affairs power violated 
a constitutional right.85 
b. Spending Power 
CWC supporters have also sought to rely on the Govern-
ment's spending power. Basically, the line of reasoning is that 
companies who contract with the Government will "waive" their 
Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of doing business with 
the Government.86 
If this argument is valid, one wonders the extent of its logic. 
Could tenants in a Government housing project be forced to 
"waive" their rights under the Fourth Amendment as a condi-
tion of receiving housing?87 Why stop with the Fourth Amend-
ment? Could the Government require housing tenants to waive 
their rights against self incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment, or their right to a jury trial in a criminal case? Could the 
83. Connolly, Arms Control Today at 12 (cited in note 8) (emphasis added). 
84. E.g., United States v. United States District Coun, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Zweibon 
v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See also 
Powers, Secrecy and Power at 439-85 (cited in note 4). 
85. Lewis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 486 n.6 (Foundation Press, 
1972). See also David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions 
on Treaty Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 229,325-30 (1988). 
86. E.g., Connolly, Arms Control Today at 8, 9 (cited in note 8). 
87. The Clinton Administration, in fact, has argued that public housing tenants 
should be required to sign leases that would waive their Fourth Amendment rights and 
allow the police to search their apartments without warrants. Guy Gugliotta, Clinton 
Lets Police Raid Projects, Washington Post A1 (April 17, 1994). See also Oarence 
Page, For CHA Residents, a Fight to Keep Their Constitutional Rights, Chicago Tribune 
§1, 21 (April 13, 1994) (opposing Clinton plan); Editorial, Gun Sweeps: No Model for 
Cities, New York Times A18 (April 20, 1994) (opposing Clinton policy); Charles 
Ogletree and Abbe Smith, Clinton's Plan is Misguided, New York Times 23 (May 7, 
1994) (opposing Qinton plan). 
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Government force its contracting parties to waive their rights of 
free speech? The right against cruel and unusual punishment? 
In none of these cases is there any true "waiver," because a 
waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Instead 
the Government is conditioning benefits on the recipient giving 
up constitutional rights. The Court will not allow any such 
forced relinquishment or surrender of constitutional rights, as 
indicated in the leading case on this issue, South Dakota v. 
Dole.88 In that case Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, up-
held the power of Congress to withhold federal highway funds 
from states that allowed the purchase of liquor by people under 
21 years of age. The Court used a four-part test to determine if 
conditions imposed are valid under the spending clause. First, 
the spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare; 
second, Congress must speak "unambiguously" so that recipi-
ents of the funds exercise their choices knowingly; third, the 
condition must not be unrelated to federal interest in the par-
ticular national program; and fourth, there must not be an 
"independent constitutional bar" to the federal government's 
conditional grant of funds.89 
Let us briefly focus on that fourth requirement, that there 
be no "independent constitutional bar" to the federal govern-
ment's conditional grant of funds. In Dole, the Court found that 
the Twenty-first Amendment (dealing with state powers over 
alcohol) was not an independent constitutional bar. But, the 
Court said, Congress could not use its spending powers-
to induce the States to engage in activities that would them-
selves be unconstitutional. Thus, for example, a grant of fed-
eral funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state ac-
tion or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would 
be an illegitimate exercise of the Congress' broad spending 
90 power. 
Congress, in short, could no more use its spending power to re-
quire its contracting parties to waive their rights under the 
Fourth Amendment than it could use its spending power to re-
quire its contracting parties to waive their rights under the 
Eighth Amendment, forbidding cruel and unusual punishment. 
88. 483 u.s. 203 (1987). 
89. Id. at 209. 
90. I d. at 210-11. 
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c. "Pervasively Regulated" Industries 
The last major argument is that Congress can dispense with 
the Fourth Amendment protections such as the requirement of a 
search warrant and probable cause, because the places to be 
searched are already "pervasively regulated" so that the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment are inapplicable. 
First, many of the places to be searched are not 
"pervasively regulated." My garage, for example is not perva-
sively regulated, but it is subject to be searched under the ewe. 
The Clorox Corporation is not pervasively regulated, but chlo-
rine can be used to make poison gas. A soap manufacturer is 
not pervasively regulated, but the long arm of the ewe subjects 
the soap manufacturer to extensive searches without a warrant. 
Second, whatever the meaning of "pervasively regulated," 
the Supreme Court has told us that it does not include the Dow 
Chemical Company.91 The Dow Chemical Company is an obvi-
ous target of the CWC-indeed, the United States has already 
said that the entire "private chemical industry of the United 
States is fully subject to the inspection provisions" of the ewC.92 
But the Supreme Court has made it quite clear that the Fourth 
Amendment applies with full force to that company and others 
like it. 
The Court has explained that a "closely regulated industry" 
is "the exception," not the rule.93 What distinguishes closely 
regulated enterprises from ordinary businesses "is a long tradi-
tion of close government supervision, of which any person who 
91. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). The Court (5 to 4) 
upheld aerial observation, within navigable airspace, by the EPA of open areas, a 2000-
acre tract. The majority made it clear that Dow did not have a "subjective expectation 
of being free from aerial surveillance since Dow had taken no precautions against such 
observation, in contrast to its elaborate ground-level precautions." 476 U.S. at 230 
(emphasis added). The majority, id. at 237, acknowledged Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594 (1981 ), the case referring to "pervasively regulated businesses, and explicitly stated: 
Dow plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy 
"-:ithi.n the inte~ior ~!its covered buildings, and it is equally clear that expecta-
tion IS one soctety IS prepared to observe. 
476 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that the EPA engaged in only 
aerial observation, did not use "highly sophisticated surveillance equipment," and effec-
tuated its observations "without physical entry." Id. at 237-38 (footnote omitted) 
(emphasis in original). Needless to say, the CWC contemplates physical entry of en-
closed spaces, which would then be subject to extensive searches. 
92. Statement of the U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament: 
Chemical Weapons Convention-Compliance, July 19, 1984, reprinted in Documents on 
Disarmament 531, 534 (1984) (cited in note 32). 
93. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1978). 
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chooses to enter such a business must already be aware."94 The 
Supreme Court has warned us that "pervasively regulated busi-
ness( es)"- that is, liquor, firearms, and mining-are "responses 
to relatively unique circumstances. "95 The "businessman in a 
regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed 
upon him."96 The ewe, in contrast, is not limited to pervasively 
regulated industries. It is not even limited to commercial 
buildings. 
Donovan v. Dewey91 is the leading case presenting the 
"pervasively regulated" rationale for removing the need for a 
criminal search warrant. The case upheld warrantless inspec-
tions of underground and surface mines. The Court noted that 
the "statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and 
regularity of its application~rovides a constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant." What commentators often miss 
about this decision is why the Court dispensed with the normal 
warrant requirement. The Donovan Court found it "difficult to 
see what additional protections a warrant requirement would 
provide"99 because of three factors that the Court stressed. 
None of these factors apply to the CWC's intrusive inspections. 
First, "the Act requires inspection of all mines and specifi-
cally defines the frequency of inspection. "100 The ewe will not 
provide for regular inspection of all places that could produce or 
store chemical weapons. Indeed, because the standard inspec-
tions (i.e., the inspections other than the challenge inspections) 
are tied to the quantity of specific chemicals produced, the eligi-
bility of some facilities may be episodic. Moreover, challenge 
inspections may occur anywhere; they are not imposed solely at 
facilities capable of producing dual-use chemicals. 
Second, the Mine Act provided that a mine operator could 
know the inspector's purpose and the limits of the inspection 
because "the standards with which a mine operator is required 
to comply are all specifically set forth in the Act or in Title 30 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations."101 Needless to say, the ewe 
does not provide specificity regarding the limits of the inspec-
94. Id. at 313. 
95. Id. (citation omitted). 
96. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,271 (1973). 
97. 452 u.s. 594 (1981). 
98. Id. at 603. 
99. ld. at 605 
100. Id. at 603-04 (emphasis in original). 
101. Id. at 604. 
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tion. On the contrary, it authorizes the inspector to look in 
every nook, niche, and cranny. 
Third-and this is the most important limitation- "the Act 
provides a specific mechanism for accommodating any special 
privacy concerns that a specific mine operator might have."102 If 
the mine operator refused entry (which he or she could legally 
do-unlike the regime of the CWC), the Secretary of Labor 
could not search the premises; instead, he could only commence 
a civil action to allow a search. This injunctive proceeding pro-
vided an adversary hearing in which a court could determine 
whether the search should proceed and, if it should, under what 
limits. 103 
When the law enforcement official seeks a search warrant, 
there is no adversary proceeding. The law enforcement official 
presents his case, ex parte, before the magistrate. The Dewey 
decision gave the mine operator more protection than she would 
have received in the case of a regular search warrant. 
Another way of examining this issue is to ask whether the 
requirement of a warrant would benefit the mine operator more 
than the statutory scheme.104 The Dewey Court found that it 
would be "difficult to see what additional protection a warrant 
requirement would provide."105 The warrant requirement (the 
ex parte proceeding) offers less protection than the statute, 
which provided an adversary hearing.106 The Dewey Court gave 
the mine inspector no right to bust in without a search warrant. 
Instead, the inspector could only ask permission to inspect. If 
the mine operator refused entry, the inspector had the burden of 
going to court and seeking an injunction. The Dewey decision-
even in the case of "pervasively regulated" industries-does not 
sanction the warrantless general search that the CWC contem-
plates. 
There should be little doubt that the CWC has serious 
problems under the Fourth Amendment after Marshall v. Bar-
low's Inc. 107 In that case the Court considered a provision of the 
102. Id. at 604. 
103. Id. at 605. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure: A Treatise 
on the Fourth Amendment§ 10.2(b) at 408-08 (West, 3d ed. 1996). 
104. This analysis is developed more fully in LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 10.2(h) 
at 455-56 (cited in note 103). 
105. 452 U.S. at 605. 
106. See LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure§ 10.2(h) at 455-56 (cited in note 103): ~A 
warrant is clearly of no benefit" when a statute provides that there shall be an adversary 
hearing "in lieu of the ex parte application." 
107. 436 u.s. 307 (1978). 
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Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) permitting inspec-
tors-without any warrant-to: 
enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, 
establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or 
environment where work is performed by an employee of an 
employer ... to inspect and investigate during regular work-
ing hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable 
limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employ-
ment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, appa-
ratus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to ques-
tion privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or 
108 
employee. 
The searches that OSHA authorized were-unlike ewe 
searches-limited to business establishments. The statutory 
searches that OSHA authorized were-unlike CWC searches-
limited in scope and (as the statute kept emphasizing) 
"reasonable." Yet, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that 
this OSHA provision violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The OSHA searches were unconstitutional without a search 
warrant, even though the Court admitted that OSHA regulates 
"a myriad of safety details that may be amenable to speedy al-
teration or disguise. "109 The searches of the ewe will be more 
intrusive and more extensive than the searches discussed in the 
Marshall case. If the OSHA searches were unconstitutional, 
then a fortiori, the more extensive searches of the ewe must 
also violate the Constitution. 
3. The CWC and the Protections of American Constitutional 
Law 
The Fourth Amendment, unlike the just compensation 
clause, is not cured by the mere payment of money. The exclu-
sionary rule, monetary damages, and injunctions are three of the 
remedies that the courts have created to protect the rights se-
cured by the Fourth Amendment. The first two remedies do not 
cure the violation-they merely seek to provide some sort of 
remedy. An injunction, on the other hand, is an effective rem-
edy that is designed to prevent the violation. That is why pro-
ponents of the ewe have urged Congress to take away from the 
108. 29 U.S.C.A. § 657(a) (emphasis added). 
109. 436 U.S. at 316. 
1998] ewe AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 157 
judiciary its power to issue inlunctions of unconstitutional 
searches authorized by the ewe.' 0 
If Congress seeks to limit the powers of courts to imple-
ment the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment, the courts will 
most likely invalidate this restriction,'" and then hold that some 
or all of the ewe is unconstitutional. Then the United States 
will be in violation of international law. A treaty, as Chief Jus-
tice Marshall noted long ago, is a contract between two or more 
nations.112 If we breach this contract, we are violating interna-
tional law, even though the breach is required by our domestic 
law, that is, by our Constitution. In addition, if the United 
States does not compl~ with all of the CWC terms, the ewe 
provides for sanctions.' 3 
We should not be dumbfounded if foreign adversaries (who 
often do not respect our basic legal principles such as probable 
cause, search warrants, intellectual property, and just compensa-
tion) castigate America's refusal to follow international law, 
using these court challenges for political propaganda, claiming 
that the judicial response of American courts demonstrates that 
the United States does not really support the elimination of 
chemical weapons. Moreover, other countries may use their 
own constitutions to justify and excuse their refusal to comply 
with the ewe. 
The ewe gives only a very limited recognition to these 
problems and does not provide for a constitutional defense 
against an effort to impose sanctions, or a defense of a charge of 
violating international law. Article VII recognizes that each 
state's obligations to enact legislation must be "in accordance 
with its constitutional processes.""4 However, this requirement, 
read in context, only means that the United States must follow 
its normal procedures to enact legislation (an affirmative vote of 
both Houses of Congress plus the Presidential signature or an 
override of a veto). Unfortunately, Article VII of the ewe 
does not excuse the United States from enacting the necessary 
legislation merely because the legislation would violate our own 
Constitution. 
110. Kellman and Tanzman, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention at 16 
(cited in note 4). 
111. For a complete discussion, see Rotunda and Nowak, I Treatise on Constitu-
tional Law: Substance and Procedure§§ 2.10, 2.11 (cited in note 4). 
112 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). See also Head Money 
Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). 
113. CWC, Art. XII,, I. See also id. at n 2-4 (cited in note 6). 
114. CWC, Art. VII,, 1 (cited in note 6). 
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Part X of the Verification Annex includes an unusual para-
graph. Part X deals with challenge inspections pursuant to Arti-
cle IX and inspections of perimeters. Paragraph 41 provides 
that the inspected State-in providing access to a perimeter area 
specified in paragraph 38-must allow the inspectors "the great-
est degree of access taking into account any constitutional obli-
gations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches 
and seizures." 115 
This provision may have been drafted to give comfort, but 
it is troubling. First, it only applies to searches under paragraph 
38. The negative pregnant of this statement is that constitu-
tional obligations do not apply in other circumstances. 
Second, the last sentence of this paragraph 41 undercuts the 
narrow protection afforded earlier when it states: 
The provisions in this paragraph may not be invoked by the 
inspected State Party to conceal evasion of its obligations not 
to engage in activities prohibited under this Convention.116 
Only the United States, not a private individual, can invoke this 
paragraph, because only the United States is the "inspected 
State Party." 
Moreover, although the United States can raise an objec-
tion to searches under paragraph 38, it is asked to promise sol-
emnly that it will not raise any constitutional objections (the 
"constitutional obligation," this paragraph provides, "may not 
be invoked") for an improper purpose. But that restriction-
which limits the right of the United States to follow its own Con-
stitution-assumes the point in dispute; the inspectors cannot 
determine if the United States is raising objections for an im-
proper purpose unless the inspectors can inspect. The chilling 
effect of this paragraph cabins the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment, treats them as troublesome technicalities that pri-
vate parties cannot raise at all, and requires the United States to 
agree that it will not raise objections except in rare circum-
stances. 
D. NORESERVATIONSALLOWED 
In the past, it was quite common for the U.S. Senate to 
avoid constitutional problems by ratifying a treaty subject to 
various "reservations." The Senate, when ratifying the CWC, 
115. ewe, Verification Annex, Part X, 'I 41 (cited in note 6). 
116. ewe, Verification Annex, Part X, '141 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added). 
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purported to enact various reservations. However, the CWC 
precludes this alternative. It provides explicitly that "[t]he Arti-
cles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations." 117 
Hence, no reservations are allowed by the ewe, even if the res-
ervations are necessary in order to comply with our domestic 
law, including U.S. Constitutional Law. 
This provision is very significant and highly unusual. Be-
cause the United States has now ratified the CWC, if it enacts 
legislation contrary to the ewe, it will be violating international 
law. If the United States reserves this clause (makes a reserva-
tion to the no reservations clause) it will also be violating the 
ewe, because the CWC plainly allows no reservations. None-
theless, Congress must respect our Constitution and, at the very 
minimum, should authorize no searches under the CWC unless 
the inspectors first obtain a search warrant, from a neutral mag-
istrate, upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
describing with particularity the places to be searched and the 
things to be seized. Congress should also create a reasonable 
procedure to provide just compensation if any intellectual prop-
erty is improperly taken because of a ewe inspection. 
CONCLUSION 
We all wish that poison gas and other chemical weapons 
had never been invented, but that genie is out of the bottle. The 
Chemical Weapons Convention, unfortunately, will not fulfill its 
promise of wiping these weapons from the face of the earth, but 
it may give us a false sense of security and lull us into thinking 
that a serious problem has found a solution. Equally unfortu-
nate is the fact that the ewe will authorize intrusive inspections 
of thousands of private facilities, businesses and homes, result-
ing in the violation of the Fourth Amendment and the taking of 
intellectual property (for which this country must provide just 
compensation). 
117. CWC, Art. XXII, at 45 (cited in note 6). To leave no room for any doubt, this 
clause goes on to say, "The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to reserva-
tions incompatible with its object and purpose." Id. Hence, there can be no material 
reservation to any of the Annexes to the CWC. 
